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RECENT CASES

direct admission) of guilt, does not constit ute such an admission of guilt, that
it will be permitted in evidence in a civil action., North Dakota holds that
defendant's plea of guilty in a criminal action can be used as evidence against
him in a subsequent civil action, not only as an admission against interest,
but also as affecting credibility.7
CURTIS A. NORDHAUCEN

JOINT TENANCY-

JOINT ACCOUNTS

IN SAVINGS

BANKS-

INTENT TO

MAKE

The administrator brought an action to recover funds deposited in a joint account of decedent and defendants. In 1950, a bank
signature card was executed which authorized defendant to draw on decedent's
account. In late 1954, the account, with survivorship agreement, was created
and remained in effect until decedent's death in December 1955. Decedent,
an attorney, had given defendants, his nephew and wife, a farm and several
other gifts during his life. The district court held that the joint account was
executed for business convenience and necessity, and that it was not the
intention of the decedent to vest ownership in the defendants. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Idaho held, two justices dissenting, that the judgment
be affirmed. Idaho First Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank of Caldwell,' 340 P.2d
1103 (Idaho 1959).
The majority relied on Shurrum v. Watts,2 in which the court held that
during the lifetime of the parties, the presumption of joint tenancy and right
of survivorship isrebuttable. Idaho has joined that group of states that hold
such an account may effect a gift, and that the execution of such an account
raises a presumption of a valid joint teanancy.3 However, the majority holding,
by making the intent of the depositor the determinative factor, places the
burden of proof on the survivor, and leaves the survivorship agreement with4
out force or effect.
The dissenting judges relied on Gray v. Gray,5 in which the court established
the validity of joint accounts in Idaho, holding that where the essentials of
a valid joint tenancy as set out in the statute 6 are present, the right of the
survivor vested at the time the account was created. The dissent further
states that the agreement should be conclusive evidence of an intent to make
A VALID GiFr.

-

6. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Cloonan, 165 Kan. 68, 193 P.2d 656 (1948);
Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Connally, 206 La. 883, 20 So2d 168 (1944); see Winesett

v. Scheidt, 239 N.C. 190, 79 S.E.2d 501 (1954).
7. Clark v. Josephson, 66 N.W.2d 539 (N.D. 1954) (admission against fnterest);
Engstrom v. Nelson, 41 N.D. 530, 171 N.W. 90 (1919) (admission against interest);
Schnase v. Goetz, 18 N.D. 594, 120 N.W. 553 (1909) (credibility).
1. Contra, Gray v. Gray, 78 Idaho 439, 304 P.2d 650, 654, 655 (1956-.
2. 80 Idaho 44, 3o4 P.2d 380, 383 (1958).

3. Gray v. Gray, 78 Idaho 439, 304 P.2d 650, 654 (1956). (Some hold -intention to
make a gift is supplied by a presumption from the form of the deposit. Others deny Ihis
presumption. Idaho, in Gray v. Gray, supra, followed the former, but in the instant case
the court has completely reversed itself).
4. In the instant case the dissent stated that the majority rule would permit such an
act to be challenged in virtually every instance, 'd fo-c, the survivor to prove the decedent did precisely what he uneqivocally stated in writing that he did. Compare with
O'Brian v. Biegger, 233 Iowa 1179, 11 N.W.2d 412 (1943).
5. 78 Idaho 439, 304 P.2d, 650 (1956).
6. Idaho Code Ann., § 26-1014 (1959) (Provides that when a deposit has been made
in two or more names payable to any ,of such persons o-.r
to the survivor, it may be
paid to any of said persons, whether the other be living or not, and such payment shall
discharge the bank making the payment from its obligation to the depositors).
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a valid gift. 7 However, the dissenting opinion, while favored by logic and
reason, has found few supporters in the absence of a statute to that effect.
8
The Idaho statute which was held to be enacted for the protection of the
banks, and to have no bearing on the rights of the parties, is the more
common type of statute. There are three types of legislation pertaining to
9
joint accounts: the bank protection statute, which offers little protection to
10
joint depositors; the joint tenancy bank account statute;
and the third and
most advanced type which is exemplified by the Model Joint Bank Account
Act. This Act would make the signature card a more formal document, and
when executed in the presence of bank officials and the depositor, this
agreement would raise a conclusive presumption of a gift of the proceeds of
the account to the survivor, making allowance for questions of capacity, fraud,
and undue influence."
The joint account has been referred to as the poor man's will.12 While
eminent judges and authors have attempted to classify it under the theories
3
1 4
5
6
of joint tennacy,1 trust,
gift,' and contract,' it fits none of these classi7
fications, for by its very nature, it cannot conform to their requirements.'
18

North Dakota has a joint tenancy bank account statute,
but no case in
19
point has reached the Supreme Court in this state.
However, North Dakota
has held such a deposit to be a valid gift.20 With the widespread use of the
joint account in this state, legislation similar to the Model Act is highly
7. Gray v. Gray, 78 Idaho 439, 304 P.2d 650, 654 (1956).
8. Idaho Code Ann., § 26-1014 (1959).
9. Ibid.
10. N.D. Rev. C(de § 6-0366 (1943). "When a deposit has been made with any
banking association in the name of two persons, payable to either or payable to either
or the survivor, such deposit . . . may be paid to either of said persons whether the
other be living or not. The receipt or acquittance of the person so paid shall be a valid
and sufficient release and discharge to such banking association for any payment so
made." N.D. Rev. Code § 47-1114 (1957 Supp.) authorizes transfer of tangible or
intangible personal property with right of survivorship without the necessity of an
intermediate transfer to or through a third person and § 47-1115 declares such a
transfer by joint tenancy to be legal and valid.
11. See generally, Kepner, The joint and Survivrship Bank Account A Concept
Without a Name, 41 Calif. L. Rev. 636; 647 (1953).
12. In Re Edwards' Estate, 140 Ore. 431, 14 P.2d 274, 276 (1902).
13. O'Brian v. Biegger, 233 Iowa 1179, 11 N.W.2d 412 (1943).
14. Steiner v. Fecysz, 72 Ohio App. 18, 50 N.E.2d 617 (1942).
15. First Trust Co. v. Hammond, 140 Neb. 330, 299 N.W. 496, (1941).
16. Barbour v. First Nat. Bank, 86 N.W.2d 526 (S.D. 1957). (The court decided no
contract had been established by the evidence but reasoned that they could approve
joint bank accounts on the contract of deposit because the legislature recognied this account by enacting the bank protection statute).
17. It is not a joint tenancy, because the four unities are not present. It is not a gift,
because the donor does not surrender dominion. It is not a trust, because there is no
intention on the part of the depositor to enter into such relationship. It is not a contract,
because there is no consideration, and the contract itself does not operate as a conveyance
of the funds. See generally, Jones, The Use of Joint Bank Accounts As a Substitute For
Testamentary Disposition of Property, 17 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 42 (1955).
18. N.D. Rev. Code § 6-0366 (1943).
19. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo v. Green, 66 N.D. 160, 262 N.W. 596.598,
(1935). (The court upheld the joint account on the gift theory, stating that when the
deposit was made the decedent intended to and did make a completed gift which resulted
in a joint tenancy. "Since we hold that in the instant case there was a completed gift
. . . it is immaterial as to whether a joint tenancy . . . was created. Here, whether their
relationship was that of joint tenants, or of tenants in common, or merely that of parties
to a contractual relation, to give effect to the right of survivorship ig to carry out the
declared purpose and intent of the parties pursuant to which they entered into the
contract of subscription and deposit with the savings and loan association."). But f,
McGillivray v. First Nat. Bank, 56 N.D. 150, 217 N.W. 150 (1927).
20. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo v. Green, supra, note 19.
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* desirable, and certainly would afford the best protection for all

concerned.
MOTOR

parties
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IMPUTED

To

PASSENGERS - Plaintiff suffered physical injury in a collision while a passenger
in an automobile which was driven by his wife, and which was jointly owned
by him and his wife. The plaintiff brought action against the driver and
owner of the other car, irrespective of the fact that his wife was guilty of
contributory negligence. The Supreme Court of Michigan held, three justices
dissenting, that the negligence of the wife cannot be imputed to the husband
on a theory of agency so as to bar his right of recovery. Sherman v. Korf, 91
N.W.2d 485 (Mich. 1958).
The majority of courts hold that should an owner be present in the car
at the time of the accident a rebuttable presumption arises that the owner has
the right to control the automobile.' The "right to control" in turn, gives rise
to an agency relationship which makes the non-driving owner responsible for
the negligence of the driver thereby barring a recovery by him against third
persons. 2 However this presumption is not strengthened by reason of the
fact that the co-owners are husband and wife. 3 The majority of the justices
in the instant case state that this result is based on "sheer fiction," although
4
it survives, in Huxley's words, 'long after its brains have been knocked out."
It is argued that the exercise of a power or right to control in a swiftly moving
automobile by interfering with the driver in his operation of the car is generally foolhardy and may be extremely dangerous. 5
A minority of courts, with which the instant case agrees, dissent from
affirmation of such a strong view, contending that the presence of an owner
in the car should be but a factor to be considered in determining the existance
of a master and servant, principal and agent, or joint enterprise relationship.e
The practical effect of this result is to place the burden of proof on the
defendant, thereby limiting the applicability of the increasingly unpopular
7
doctrine of imputed negligence.
North Dakota has intimated that should an owner be present in his car
at the time of the accident, a rebuttable presumption arises that thei owner
has control and the driver is his agent in operating the vehicle, s which is
consonant with the majority view.
A joint enterprise relationship, also founded on a theory of agency, 9 has
1. Pearson v. Erb, 82 N.W.2d 818 (N.D. 1957); Ross v. Burgan, 163 Ohio St.
211, 126 N.E.2d 592 (1955); Fox v. Lavander, 89 Utah 115, 56 P.2d 1049 (1936);

Archer v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry., 215 Wis. .509, 255 N.W. 67 (1934).
2. Gaines v. Hardware, 86 So.2d 218 (La. 1956); Santore v. Reading Co., 170 Ila.
Super. 57, 84 A.2d 375 (1951); Fox v. Lavander, supra note 1. See, Grover v. Sharp &
Fellows Contracting Co., 66 Cal. App. 2d 736, 153 P.2d 83 (1944).
3. Pearson v. Erb, 82 N.W.2d 818 (N.D. 1957).
4. Cf. Parker v. McCartney, 338 P.2d 371 (Ore. 1959).
5. Southern Pac. Co. v. Wright, 248 Fed. 261 (9th Cir. 1918); Jenks v. Veeder
Contracting Co., 177 Misc. 240, 30 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1941); Hoag v. New York Cent. &
H.R.R., 111 N.Y. 199, 18 N.E. 648 (1888).
6. Painter v. Lingon, 193 Va. 840, 71 S.E.2d 355 (1952). See, Roach v. Parker, 48
Del. 519, 107 A.2d 798 (1954); Petersen v. Schneider, 154 Neb. 303, 47 N.W.2d 863
(1951); Rogers v. Saxton, 305 Pa. 479, 158 Atl. 166 (1931).
7. See Briker v. Green, 313 Mich. 218, 21 NW.2d 105 (1946).
8. Cf. Pearson v. Erb, 82t N.W.2d 818 (N.D. 1957).
9. DeVillars v. Hessler, 363 Pa. 498, 70 A.2d 333 (1950); Bolt v. Gibson, 225 S.C.
538, 83 S.E.2d 191 (1954); Straffus v. Barclay, 147 Tex. 600, 219 S.W.2d 65 (1949);
Loomis v. Abelson, 101 Vt. 459, 144 Adt. 378 (1929). Contra, see Roach v. Parker, 48

